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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. WHETHER THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS LAWFUL. 
2. WHETHER EVIDENCE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO OR AS A RESULT OF 
THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review for the issues is for correctness with 
no particular deference given to the decision of the district court. Landes v. Capital City Bank, 
795 P.2d 1127, at 1129, (Utah 1990). 
These issues were preserved in the trial court by the entry of a conditional plea of guilty 
under Rule 1 l(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure which provides that: 
"With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty—or no contest, reserving 
in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment to a review of the 
adverse determination of any specific pre-trial motion. A defendant who 
prevails shall be allowed to withdraw the plea/' 
The issues were further preserved under the authority of State v Sery, 758 P.2d 935 
(Ut Ct. App.,1988) (conditional plea agreement, record p.l 12) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
§41 -6-44( 11) Utah Code Annotated provides: 
"a peace officer may without a warrant arrest a person for violation of this 
section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person." 
-1-
§77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
" A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without a 
warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of 
any peace officer—; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; — 
§76-8-306. Obstruction of justice—Elements—Penalties—Exceptions. 
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a 
criminal offense: 
(a) provides any person with a weapon; 
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from 
performing any act that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person; 
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be 
false; 
(e) harbors or conceals a person; 
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of 
avoiding discovery or apprehension; 
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension; 
(h) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the 
offense, after a judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the 
information; or 
(i) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the 
conduct constituting an offense, or any other material aspect of the 
investigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah 
County entered by the Honorable Howard H. Maetani on August 1, 2001. It is a criminal action in 
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which the Defendant is charged with a violation of Section 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American 
Fork City. The Information was filed February 16, 2000 (p. 5). 
Course of Proceedings: To the charges contained in the information the Defendant 
initially entered a plea of not guilty (record p. 4). On March 13, 2000 he filed a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained while in custody following his arrest, (record p. 16). It was supported 
by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (record p.26). 
Disposition in the Court below: A hearing was held and oral arguments presented on 
May 3, 2000. (record p. 44) On June 28, 2000 the motion was denie&(record p.81). 
On January 24, 2001 the Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges contained in 
the information. With the approval of the prosecutor and the Court, the issues raised by his 
motion to suppress were reserved for review on appeal, (record p.l 10). Final judgment and 
sentence was entered August 1, 2001. (record p. 134) A certificate of probable cause was issued 
on that date.(record p.136). Notice of appeal was filed on August 2, 2001. (record p. 142). 
Statement of facts relevant to the issues: All transcript references are to the May 
3,2000 hearing. 
On January 30, 2000 at approximately 9:30 p.m. the defendant was arrested by Officer 
Southard of the American Fork City Police Department. The arrest took place inside the 
defendant's home at 403 West 300 South in American Fork City.(Tr.p. 16) There was no warrant 
served and there were none outstanding at the time. (Tr.p.19) Immediately prior to the arrest, 
Officer Southard had been invited by the defendant into his home where the defendant was advised 
by the officer that he had been identified as the driver of a vehicle parked outside the defendant's 
house, and that he was suspected of doing so while under the influence of alcohol.(Tr.p 18) The 
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officer detected what he believed to be a "strong odor of alcohol" coming from the defendant's 
breath and asked the defendant to submit to a series of field sobriety tests(Tr.p.l7). The defendant 
voiced his refusal to submit to any such field tests and declined to cooperate when one was 
attempted. Officer Southard was then directed by the defendant to leave his home. The defendant 
was advised that he would be arrested for obstructing justice of he didn't cooperate with the field 
tests. The defendant responded with a renewal of his request that the officer leave his home, 
whereupon he was placed under arrest for the stated offense of obstructing justice. The defendant 
was then handcuffed, taken into custody, and transported from his home to the American Fork 
City police station, (defendant's ex 1, record page 53 at page 48) During direct testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's motion to suppress the officer testified that he also 
observed glassy, bloodshot eyes and the defendant was "slightly swaying"(Tr.p.l7) Defendant's 
continued refusal to cooperate with the field tests resulted in his arrest. He was handcuffed and 
transported to the American Fork City Police station. (Tr.P.17). 
While in custody the defendant was again directed to submit to a series of field tests at the 
police station. Officer Southard testified to the following: 
"I told him that if he would deal with the field-sobriety tests, instead of him 
going to jail that if he qualified he'd be released to a responsible person. 
Instead of taking him to jail that night, I would release him to somebody else. 
He then cooperated with the field-sobriety test at that point in time." 
(Transcript p. 20 @ line 13) 
Field coordination tests were performed at that time and place. Following their 
completion the defendant was advised that he was now under the arrest for driving under the 
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influence of alcohol, and an intoxilyzer test was requested, consented to, and performed.(Tr.p.l7) 
It is the results of these tests that the defendant seeks to suppress. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
1. Refusal to submit to a field sobriety test does not constitute the offense of 
obstructing justice. Commission of that crime involves aflBrmative action with a specific intent to 
hinder, delay or prevent. It does not include benign refusal to assist in building probable cause. It 
does not fit the defendant's conduct here. 
2. At the time the defendant was placed under arrest he was not engaged in the 
commission of any crime, nor was there probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime 
for which a lawful arrest for anything could be justified. The arresting officer was investigating a 
possible violation of the traffic rules against driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was 
looking for probable cause to support a lawful arrest for that offense. An arrest for obstruction of 
justice was an inappropriate means to attempt to achieve that end no matter how well intended it 
may have been. 
3. Evidence obtained incident to or resulting from the unlawful arrest of the defendant 
should be suppressed. This position is supported by case law out of this Court. It is the only 
logical remedy available to an aggrieved suspect in a criminal investigation of the type we are 
dealing with here. To hold otherwise creates a dangerous precedence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE. 
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The Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests. He was warned that to 
continue to do so was an obstruction of justice. It is not. No law requires him to do so. Violation 
of the obstruction of justice statute in Utah requires affirmative action with a specific intent to 
hinder, delay or prevent the occurrence of specific events outlined in the statute. It does not 
include a person's refusal to do anything but remain silent and motionless when instructed to 
engage in conduct the sole purpose of which is to mcriminate him by building probable cause to 
justify his arrest. As will more fully appear in the development of points 2 and 3, the defendant's 
conduct does not fit the crime for which he was arrested. 
POINT 2: AT THE TIME THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED UNDER 
ARREST HE WAS NOT ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF 
ANY CRIME, NOR WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE THAT HE HAD COMMITTED A CRIME FOR WHICH 
A LAWFUL ARREST FOR ANYTHING COULD BE MADE 
The gravamen of the crime of obstructing justice is that the defendant performs an 
affirmative act to prevent or hinder the prosecution, conviction, or punishment of someone. The 
statute is not applicable to the defendant in this action. Clearly, the offense of obstructing justice 
was not being committed by the defendant when he refused Officer Southward's request for the 
performance of field sobriety tests. He was impeding the officer's ability to establish probable 
cause to legitimize his subsequent arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Such conduct 
is not a criminal act. 
If we conclude as a matter of law that there was no probable cause to effect an arrest of the 
defendant for the offense of obstructing justice, it still remains to be determined whether or not 
there was probable cause to arrest him for any offense either being committed in the presence of 
the officer or for which he had probable cause. The officer's testimony on direct examination at 
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the suppression hearing as it relates to the arrest that was made by him played out as follows: (May 
3, 2000; hearing transcript pp. 16-20) 
Q: "On the evening of that day (January 30, 2000) approximately 9:00 p.m. you 
responded to 400 West 300 South, American Fork City. 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: What was the reason for your going to that location? 
A: We had received a dispatch on a custodial interference assist for Lehi Police 
Department. Officer Shelby tod made contact with the suspect vehicle and 
suspects. I responded to her location to offer assistance as a back up officer. 
Q: What did you do when you arrived at that location? 
A: When I arrived, I observed Officer Shelby dealing with Gina Singleton. I came up 
from behind her and asked her what she needed me to do to assist her in this call. 
She indicated that she wanted me to make contact with the driver who I knew from 
the dispatch report was intoxicated, or reported as intoxicated. I went to make 
contact with the driver of the vehicle. 
Q: Was it the defendant, Larry Singleton? 
A: There was two people I observed in the immediate area of the sidewalk that leads 
to the front door. There was a young gentleman wearing a light blue shirt. I 
believe his name was Josh Singleton, the son. I approached him first and said, 
"Were you the driver of the vehicle?' He pointed towards his dad and said, "It 
wasn't me, it was him." And so I in turn made contact with Larry Singleton, who is 
the defendant sitting here. 
Q: Then what happened? 
A: I approached Larry and I asked him if he had driven the truck. Larry indicated he 
had driven the truck, and Officer Shelby later indicated to me that she had seen him 
driving, then exit the vehicle. I advised Larry that I could detect a strong odor of 
alcohol coming from his breath. I noticed that he had glassy, bloodshot eyes. And 
that while he was talking to me he was slightly swaying, his body would sway back 
and forth. I told him that I thought he had been drinking. His response was, "No, 
you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to drink." I told him I have dealt 
with this enough to know what an intoxicated person looks and smells like and I 
believe he had. 
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Then what happened? 
We went back and forth over this. I told him I wanted to do a field sobriety test. 
He would start to do the field sobriety test, and then he would become 
uncooperative and wouldn't perform the test for me. He tried to explain to me 
what the situation was with their granddaughter and daughter in Lehi. And then I 
says, "Look, it's cold out here. Why don't we go inside?" We all proceeded inside 
because it was cold. 
Whose suggestion was that? 
This was Larry's. 
Okay, then what happened? 
I advised Officer Shelby, "Why don't we take everybody inside where it is warm." 
... Once again I explained to Larry that I wanted to conduct a field sobriety test.... 
Once again I returned to my field sobriety tests with Mr. Singleton. I asked Mr. 
Singleton if he could see the top of my pen. I told him with which ever index finger 
he felt the most comfort with, to reach out and touch the top of my pen. He 
reached out with his middle finger and touched it with his middle finger and had a 
difficult time doing that. I would explain to him that what I wanted him to do was 
to follow the pen, not to move his head. 
What, with his eyes? 
Follow with his eyes only. 
Okay. 
He indicated that he understood the instructions. I would attempt to move the pen, 
and he would just glare at me angrily. And I says "Okay, let's try this again. You 
need to follow with your eyes," and repeated the instructions. We tried that three 
or four times. He then explained to me, "You have no right to be in my house. 
You don't have a warrant. Get out of my house." And I says, "Well, you invited 
us in here. I believe that you are DUI. I need to conduct these field sobriety tests 
to further determine your status." And he became uncooperative, and says, "No, 
you need to get out of my house." I told him he had his choice as to that. I was 
going to arrest him for DUI or that he was obstructing justice by not complying 
with my request for a field sobriety. I told him that I would arrest him for that, and 
that he could take care of the matter down at the police department. 
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Q: And then what happened? 
A: At that point in time, he walked past me and told me that it was "You know, 
bullshit." As he walked past me, I grabbed hold of his wrists and placed him in 
custody. He was then placed in my patrol car and taken to the police department. 
Q: Where you performed the field sobriety tests and intoxilyzer test? 
A: Once again, he was uncooperative. I explained to him that, you know, I understand 
this situation. It was tense with his granddaughter. There was some other issues 
there that they were worried about protecting their granddaughter. I says, "You 
need to deal with this." I told him that if he would deal with the filed sobriety tests, 
instead of him going to jail, that if he qualified he would be released to a responsible 
person. Instead of taking him to jail that night, I would release him to somebody 
else. He then cooperated with the field sobriety tests at that point in time." 
It is apparent that the officer, in essence, observed the strong odor of alcohol on someone 
he had reasonable cause to believe had been driving, and he observed red, glassy eyes and a slight 
swaying motion. This would be sufficient evidence to stop and detain and to make fiirther inquiry. 
The officer did that. When that fiirther inquiry produced nothing in the way of field sobriety tests, 
however, he initiated the arrest. That action was premature. 
The only probable cause for effecting a valid arrest came as a result of field sobriety tests 
that were performed at the police station after the original arrest had been effected. Again, citing 
the transcript (at page 26): 
Q: "Okay, then after you took him into custody, took him to the police station, and he 
was under arrest for obstructing justice, that's when you proceeded to perform a 
coordination test again, right? 
A: Yes, obstructing justice for not initially taking the field sobriety test. 
Q: Right. And so at the police station he proceeded, under arrest, to cooperate with 
you. He did the horizontal gaze and your (inaudible) test. And he had ... or 
attempted the heal-to-toe test, right? 
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A: Yes. 
Q: And at that point in time, you changed it and charged him... you told him he was 
under the arrest for DUL And that's when you told him about the intoxilyzer test 
you wanted him to take, right? 
A: Okay, help me understand your question there. Are you saying that I dropped the 
obstruction of justice and went with the DUI? 
Q: No, no. I didn't say that you dropped the obstruction of justice charge. I am 
saying that at that point after he failed his field sobriety test at the police station 
according to the report on page 8, that's when you told him: "You are under arrest 
for DUI, and I am requesting that you take the intoxilyzer test." Is that correct? 
A: That's the continuing portion of the DUI protocol. Yes." 
The criteria for establishing probable cause to arrest in a case of this kind has been 
summarized by this Court in the case of Layton City vs. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (1987) with this 
language: 
"In determining whether Officer Robinette had probable cause to arrest Noon for 
driving under the influence of alcohol we must ask whether from the facts known to 
the officer and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom a reasonable 
and prudent person in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense." 
In that case the Court found the requisite probable cause based upon the officer's 
observations that the defendant smelled heavily of alcohol; the officer had the defendant blow into 
the officer's hand to determine the source of the alcohol smell; the defendant could not complete 
an accurate recitation of the alphabet A through Z as requested; the defendant attempted to stand 
with both legs together and then raise either foot six inches off the ground and hold it there; the 
defendant fell backwards almost as soon as he lifted his foot, and the officer caught him in mid fall. 
These were all pre-arrest observations. After reciting these facts the Court made the following 
statement: 
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"Applying this standard to Officer Robinette's knowledge at the time of Noon's 
arrest, we are convinced that Robinette reasonably believed Noon had committed 
the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol." 
The Court noted that the mere fact that the officer had not seen the defendant actually 
driving the vehicle was not fatal to the existence of probable cause and we make no such claim in 
the case at bar. 
American Fork City police officer Southard, in his initial report (Defendant's exhibit I, 
record p. 48) made the following observations and statements about his initial contact with the 
Defendant. 
"I approached Larry SINGLETON and asked him if he had driven the truck. 
Larry indicated that he was the driver of the truck. Officer SHELBY later 
indicated to me that Larry was the person she observed driving the truck—. I 
advised Larry that I could detect a very strong odor of alcohol coming from 
his mouth.— 
"I advised Larry that I was going to conduct some field sobriety tests. Larry 
asked if we could all go inside the house because it was very cold and he 
wanted to get his granddaughter inside. We all went into the house. 
"3. ATTEMPTED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS; 
"Officer SHELBY was in the living room dealing with Gina and I entered the 
kitchen trying to get Larry to quit avoiding me and comply with the test I was 
requesting of him. Larry finally stood in front of me and I gave instructions 
for the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. Larry touched the top of the pen as 
requested with the wrong finger. (Middle finger instead of index finger). 
Larry was supposed to follow the pen with his eyes, but only glared at me with 
an angry look. I re-advised him of the instructions and started the test again. 
Once again he refused to follow the pens movements and glared at me. 
"Larry then told me I had no right to be in his home without a warrant and 
for me to get out of his house. I told Larry he had to comply with my test 
request or I would be forced to arrest him for obstructing justice.— 
441 again turned my attention back to Larry and asked him if he was going to 
take the test or be arrested for obstructing justice. Larry responded with 
-11-
"F you, we are just trying to save this baby and all you can do is make 
more trouble." I asked my question again and Larry said that I wasn't going 
to be arresting anyone. He walked past me into the living room/hallway and I 
grabbed his hand and got him into a wrist lock. I advised him that he was 
under arrest for obstruction of justice and he started to resist. Officer 
SHELBY had to assist me by applying a wrist lock to the other hand. Larry 
was placed into handcuffs without any further resistance. 
4. FINAL FIELD SOBRIETY TEST; 
"I transported Larry to the police department and offered him another 
chance at the field sobriety test. He took the requested test and did poorly on 
all tests. 
5. INTOXILYZER TEST RESULTS; 
"Larry took a breath test and the result was .249. The intoxilyzer result and 
operational checklist were placed into evidence." 
Applying the Noon case criteria to the facts of this case shows that from the facts known to 
the Officer and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position would conclude that the situation needed further investigation but not an 
arrest. The Defendant could have been detained without arrest while inquiry was made as to what 
caused the police to be called in the first place. The officer doesn't disclose any exigent 
circumstances that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to conclude that immediate attest 
under the circumstances was necessary. We must therefore conclude that there were none that 
could be articulated, only that it was the convenient thing to do - a shortcut, if you will, to where 
the officer wanted to go. 
POINT 3: EVIDENCE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO OR RESULTING FROM 
THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT IS INADMISSIBLE 
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In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, (Utah 1987), the Court held, in essence, that where an 
arrest is illegal, evidence obtained as a result thereof is inadmissible. This position was supported 
also in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990). In that case the court made it clear that the 
appropriate sanction for illegally obtained evidence is exclusion. If this were a case of harmless 
inadvertence on the part of the arresting officer, that is arguably another matter. The record, 
including the officer's initial report, (record p. 53), clearly indicates that this was not the case. 
Arresting the defendant was a deliberate act intended to place him in a position of custody to 
which he should not have been subjected. Probable cause as the Noon case defines it was not 
there. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The offense of obstructing justice did not occur. At the time of the Defendant's arrest at 
his home there was not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that any offense 
had been committed. That evidence came only after the initial arrest. It should be inadmissible. 
The defendant's motion to suppress that evidence should have been granted, and it was not. This 
Court is requested to enter it's order directing that the order of the trial Court dated June 28, 2000 
(record p. 81) and the minute entry ruling entered June 14, 2000 (record p. 78) denying the 
Defendant's motion to suppress be reversed. 
To do otherwise creates a dangerous precedence. It encourages law enforcement officers 
to take short cuts to establish probable cause by intimidation tactics. Or at best to arrest on 
marginal probable cause where a little more investigation or inquiry might more clearly establish its 
existence. It would at least put the investigator in a position to establish that everything that could 
have been done to build strong probable cause had in fact at least been attempted. That is the 
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criteria by which good police work should be measured. For the Court to take that position goes 
a long way toward fostering professionalism in law enforcement. 
Respectfully submitted January *?, 2002. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
A copy of this document istflailed to James Tucker Hansen, Attorney for 
PlaintiflTRespondent January^^f2002, first class postage prepaid at American Fork, Utah to the 
following address: 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes not reproduced 
verbatim in the brief 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv-
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
panels of that court and all courts of lower 
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except pei 
for a first 
(g) app 
lenging tl 
involving 
(h) api 
including 
custody, J 
(i) app 
(j) cas< 
(3) The Co 
judges of the 
review and d 
original appe 
(4) The Cc 
Chapter 46b, 
tive proceedi: 
History: C. ] 
1986, ch. 47, § 
ch. 73, § 1; 19 
248, § 8; 1990, 
1991, ch. 268, § 
ch. 13, § 45; 1 
159, § 19; 1996 
Amendment 
ment, effective 
tion (2)(h) and r 
(2)(h) through ( 
(k). 
The 1994 ami 
substituted "Be 
"Board of Pan 
inserted "Adm 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 am 
substituted "S 
Decisions of Be 
Extraordinary 
Final order. 
Habeas corpus 
Post-convictioi 
Scope. 
— Sentence re 
Cited. 
Decisions of 
The Court 
orders on petit 
lenging decisi 
cept when the 
the conviction 
felony or a ca] 
be heard by 
House, 886 P. 
14 
COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
judge from 
'he term of 
i elected. A 
more than 
r an acting 
brig judge, 
ig judge by 
ie duties of 
Is; and 
tie Judicial 
B Supreme 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
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(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46? 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of 'Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as 
(2)(d) to (2)(j). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final order. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
— Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). 
Extraordinary writs. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. Murphy, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition originally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard 
v. Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
15 
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588 (Utah 1980). 
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i the subject. Salt Lake City 
L13, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
J.S. Motor Vehicles § 625(1) 
e," in addition to the. 
ff-highway vehicles as 
n April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
VI, Section 25. 
e-, and four-wheeled vehicles 
of driving while intoxicated 
i.5th 659. 
41-6-43-10- Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. 
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), 
relating to negligent homicide, was repealed by 
Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(hi) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(c) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(d) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
407 
ADDENDUM B 
Parts of record on appeal 
of central importance 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SINGLETON, LARRY J. 
403 West 300 South 
American Fork, UT 84003 
DOB: 08-31-54 
Defendant. 
INFORMATION 
Citation No. D329581 
Case No. ()(fp\(fl^^ 
The undersigned states on information and belief that the Defendant committed the 
crime of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in 
American Fork City, Utah County, on January 30, 2000,, in violation of Section 41-6-44 of the 
Ordinances of American Fork City. 
The act ofDefendant constituting the crime was that the Defendant did operate or was 
in actual physical control of a vehicle at a time when the Defendant's blood or breath alcohol 
concentration was .08 grams or greater or at a time when the Defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which rendered 
the Defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses: Officer 
Lisa Shelby. 
AMERICAN FORK CITY PROSECUTOR 
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NOALL T. VVOOTTON -- #3554 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801)756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
LARRY J. SINGLETON. 
Defendant. 
Case No. Oo5\0&Vb% m o 
Defendant respectfully moves the court pursuant to Rule 1.2 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Amendments 4 and 5 of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 7 and 14 of the Constitution of Utah, to suppress all evidence obtained subsequent to 
the arrest of the defendant at his home on charges of Obstructing Justice. 
The motion is based upon the following tacts: 
No crime was committed in the presence of the arresting officer; and 
There was no probable cause to believe that the crime for which the arrest was 
made had been committed. 
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This motion is supported by the attached statement of points and authorities. 
Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing and oral arguments. 
Dated this Z^jfday of March, 2000. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this -^Vfo day of March, 2000, a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS was mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
lames "Tucker" Hansen 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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MOALL T. W00TT0N -- #3554 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801)756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY. AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY J. SINGLETON, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. OO^OO^fc fTiD 
Defendant submits the following statement of points and authorities in support 
of his pending motion to suppress. 
FACTS 
For purposes of this statement, the Defendant relies on the narrative portions of 
the written report of investigating officer Lee Southard of the American Fork City Police 
Department. That portion of his report is attached to this memorandum. It was received from 
the Office of the City Prosecutor pursuant to Defendant's request. For purposes of his Motion 
to Suppress, Defendant will stipulate to the relevant facts as therein set forth. 
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On Januaiy 30, 2000 at approximately 9:30 p.m. the Defendant was arrested by 
Officer Lee Southard of the American Fork City Police Department. The arrest took place inside 
the Defendant's home at 403 West 300 South in American Fork City. At that time and place the 
Defendant was charged with the offense of Obstructing Justice. Immediately prior to the arrest, 
Officer Southard had been invited by the Defendant into his home where he was advised by the 
officer that he had been identified as the driver of a vehicle parked outside the house and that he 
was suspected of doing so while under the influence of alcohol. The officer detected what Ire 
believed to be a "strong odor of alcohol" coming from the Defendant's breath and asked the 
Defendant to submit to a series of field sobriety tests. The Defendant voiced his refusal to 
submit to any such field tests and declined to cooperate when one was attempted. Officer 
Southard was then invited by the Defendant to leave his house. That invitation was declined. 
The Defendant was instead advised he would be arrested for Obstructing Justice if he didn't 
cooperate. The Defendant responded with a renewal of his request that the Officer leave his 
home whereupon he was placed under arrest for the offense of obstructing justice. Defendant 
was then handcuffed, taken into custody, and transported from his home to the American Fork 
City police station. 
While in custody the Defendant was again directed to submit to a series of field 
tests at the police station. Tests were performed at that time and place. Following their 
completion the Defendant was advised that he was now under arrest for diiving under the 
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influence of alcohol and an intoxilyzer test was requested and performed. It is the results of this 
test and the results of the field sobriety tests performed at the police station that the Defendant 
seeks to suppress. 
POINTS 
1. Refusal to submit to field sobriety tests does not constitute the offense of 
Obstructing Justice. 
2. At the time the Defendant was placed under arrest for Obstructing Justice, he 
was not engaged in the commission of any crime nor was there probable cause to believe that he 
had committed a crime for which a lawful arrest for anything could be justified. 
3. Evidence obtained incident to or resulting from the invalid arrest of the 
Defendant is inadmissible. 
AUTHORITIES 
State v. Memloza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). Where arrest is illegal evidence 
obtained as a result thereof is inadmissible. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). The appropriate sanction for 
illegally obtained evidence is exclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
The offense of Obstructing Justice is set out in §76-8-306 of the Utah Criminal 
Code. A copy of the entire section is attached hereto as part of this memorandum. In essence, 
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however, it provides that a person is guilty of an offense if, with the intent to prevent, hinder, or 
delay the discovery apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment OF ANOTHER for 
the commission of a crime, he commits one or more of the acts enumerated in said statute. The 
gravamen of that crime is that the Defendant performs an affirmative act to prevent or hinder the 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of someone other than the Defendant. That statute 
clearly is not applicable to the Defendant in this action. Clearly, the offense of Obstructing 
Justice was not being committed by the Defendant when he refused Officer Southard's request 
for performance of field sobriety tests. He was impeding the officer's ability to establish 
probable cause to legitimize a subsequent arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, 
but such conduct is not a criminal act. 
That having been said, the case law is replete with authority to the effect that the 
appropriate remedy is to not only find that the arrest was invalid, but that any evidence logically 
following from it should be declared to be inadmissible. This is not a case of harmless 
inadvertence on the part of the arresting officer. It was a deliberate act intended to place the 
Defendant in a position of incarceration to which he should not have been subjected based upon 
the information the officer had at that time. The Mendozci case and the Larocco case cited above 
are examples of the present status of the case law concerning the inadmissibility of evidence that 
has its roots in an arrest that is improper. Probable cause, if any existed, to support the 
subsequent arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol, which in turn gave the officer 
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the right to request an intoxilyzer test, all arose out of the initial arrest for obstructing justice. 
That arrest subjected the Defendant to the in-custody environment in which the subsequent field 
sobriety tests were performed. They would not have been performed but for that improper 
arrest. Their results and the results of any chemical test that followed must therefore be 
suppressed if the current law on the subject is to be followed. 
In summary, it is submitted that the offense of Obstructing Justice did not occur, 
nor did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that it had. Thus, the Defendant's 
arrest for the same was invalid and any evidence in the nature of field sobriety tests performed 
after that arrest as well as the intoxilyzer test result should be suppressed. 
Dated this ^ ^ d a y of March, 2000. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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In The Fourth District Court, State of Utah 
Utah County, American Fork Department 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
vs 
LARRY J. SINGLETON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case #005100338 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. The prosecutor is to prepare the appropriate 
order. 
DATED O^^y / ^ > > ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Ruling was 
mailed to the following, postage pre-paid, this 15th day of June, 2000. 
Bruce Murdock, 306 W. Main, American Fork, Utah 84003 
Noall T. Wootton, PO Box 727, American Fork, Utah 84003 
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NOALL T. WOOTTON - #3554 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
CONDITIONAL PLEA AGREEMENT 
vs. 
LARRY J. SINGLETON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 005100338 MD 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
American Fork City, Plaintiff, through James "Tucker" Hansen, its attorney, and 
the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, and Noall T. Wootton, his attorney of record, hereby stipulate 
and agree as follows: 
This stipulation is entered into pursuant to the authorization of State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, (Utah Ct. App., 1988). 
The Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in American Fork City, Utah County, on January 30,2000, in violation of §41-6-
44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City. 
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On March 7, 2000 the Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress all evidence 
obtained subsequent to the arrest of the Defendant at his home on charges of obstructing justice. 
Having received evidence in support of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and 
having reviewed the memoranda of the parties, this Court issued its ruling on June 14, 2000 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Pursuant to the Court's ruling, the parties hereby specifically agree as follows: 
a. The Defendant shall tender his plea of guilty/no contest to one count 
of driving while under the influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, as charged in the 
Information. 
b. The Defendant shall be allowed to preserve his right of appeal in order 
to present his challenge to the admissibility of the evidence as outlined in his Motion to Suppress. 
c. The City agrees that if the Defendant's arguments in favor of 
suppression are accepted by the appellate court, the City will not oppose the Defendant's motion 
to withdraw his above-noted plea. 
Dated this ^-M day of January, 2001. 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
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Dated this _ day of January, 2001. 
/ 
LARR] 
Defendant 
T> A \ 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
APPROVAL OF "SERY" PLEA 
Upon the foregoing stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing, this 
Court hereby approves the agreement of the parties and orders that the Defendant's plea entered 
in this matter shall be conditioned on the preservation of his right to appeal this Court's denial 
of his Motion to Suppress and shall be further conditioned on Defendant's preserving his right 
to withdraw such plea should his arguments in favor of the suppression be accepted by the 
appropriate appellate court. 
DATED this _Jf day of. 
vr 
2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
JDGE TOWARD H. MAETAM 
Fourth Distnct Court 
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4TH DISTRICT CT - AF DEPT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LARRY J SINGLETON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 005100338 MD 
Judge: HOWARD H. MAETANI 
Date: August 1, 20 01 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jilll 
Prosecutor: ANDERSON, BRETT C 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WOOTTON, NOALL T. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 31, 1954 
Audio 
Tape Number: 018 9 Tape Count: 1940 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 170 
day(s). 
Page 1 
Case No: 
Date: 
005100338 
Aug 01, 2001 
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE 
10 DAYS JAIL STAYED IF DEFENDANT COMPLIES. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $200.00 
Surcharge: $674.05 
Due: $1474.05 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $200.00 
Total Surcharge: $674.05 
Total Principal Due: $1474.05 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 08/01/2004. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by DISTRICT COURT. 
Defendant to serve 10 day(s} jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1474.05 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before August 1, 2004. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
KEEP COURT ADVISED OF CURRENT MAILING ADDRESS & AGREE TO SERVICE BY 
MAIL. DEFENDANT WAIVES SERVICE BY ANY OTHER MEANS. 
DEFENDANT IS TO APPEAR IN COURT WHENEVER GIVEN NOTICE BY MAIL OR 
OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE COURT TO DO SO. 
DEFENDANT SHALL NOT VIOLATE ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR MUNICIPAL LAW 
REPORT TO HUMAN SERVICES, 100 E. CENTER, SUITE L 6 00, PROVO, UTAH, 
370-8427 WITHIN 10 DAYS AND MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO HAVE AN ALCOHOL 
OR SUBSTANCE ABUSE EVALUATION, & PAY THE COST(S) . COMPLETE ANY 
RECOMMENDED TREATMENT. 
DEFENDANT TO INSTALL IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM WITHIN 3 0 DAYS & IS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COSTS. PROVIDE PROOF TO COURT THAT DEVICE WAS 
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Case No: 005100338 
Date: Aug 01, 2001 
INSTALLED WITHIN 3 0 DAYS. DEFENDANT MUST SUBMIT DRIVERS LICENSE TO 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION FOR A RESTRICTION CODE. 
DEFENDANT MUST NOT TAMPER IN ANYWAY WITH THE DEVICE. BAC TO BE SET 
AT .025 AND IS TO BE MONITORED EVERY 3 MONTHS BY VENDOR. VENDOR TO 
OBTAIN THE VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (VIN) FROM VEHICLE & 
REPORT THAT INFO TO THE COURT. 
Dated this / day of Q'Lc^pfUL^ , 2 0 &/. ,,•'..... 
HOWARD H. MAETANE -
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 005100338 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LARRY J SINGLETON 
DEFENDANT 
403 W 300 S 
American Fork, UT 84 003 
Mail BRETT ANDERSON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
3 06 W MAIN 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84 0 03 
Mail NOALL T. WOOTTON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
8 NORTH CENTER STREET 
PO BOX 727 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84 003-0727 
Dated this _l day of (%j(0FV , 20 (j\ . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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NOALL T. W00TT0N -- #3554 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, Utah 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LARRY J. SINGLETON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 005100338 
Notice is hereby given that the Defendant, Larry J. Singleton, appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court the final judgment and sentence of the above entitled court adjudging him guilty 
of violating the provisions of 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City which judgment 
was entered January 24, 2001. Sentence was pronounced August 1,2001. 
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The appeal is taken from the whole of said judgment that was entered pursuant to 
a Conditional Plea agreement. 
Dated this /J?~ day of August, 2001. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /&f"day of August, 2001,1 caused the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to be duly served upon the following parties by the service method indicatec 
below. 
James "Tucker" Hansen 
DUVAL, HANSEN, WITT & MORLEY 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ «-^Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax: 
[ ] Other: [Specify] 
